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The Price of Closing the "Value Gap":
How the Music Industry Hacked EU
Copyright Reform
Annemarie Bridy*
ABSTRACT

Sweeping changes are coming to copyright law in the European
Union. Following four years of negotiations, the European Parliament

in April 2019 approved the final text of the Digital Single Market (DSM)
Directive. The new directive contains provisions for enhancing
cross-border access to content available through digital subscription
services, enabling new uses of copyrighted works for education and
research, and, most controversially, "clarifying" the role of online
services in the distribution of copyrighted works.
Article 17 of the DSM Directive is directed to the last of these
goals. It was designed to address the so-called value gap-the music
industry's longstanding complaint that YouTube underpays music
rights holders for streams of user-uploaded videos containing claimed
copyrighted content. The text of the DSM Directive nowhere mentions
YouTube, but anyone versed in the politicaleconomy of digitalcopyright
knows that Article 17 was designed specifically to make YouTube pay.
The important question in the wake of Article 17's adoption is who else
will pay-and in what ways.
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This Article offers a focused examinationof Article 17as a public
law created to settle a private score between the music industry and
YouTube. Part II explains and critiques the "value gap" as a policy
rationalefor altering the scope of copyright safe harbors. PartIII breaks
down the terms of the European Commission's original proposal for
Article 13 (which later became Article 17) in relation to existing
provisions of the E-Commerce Directive and the Information
Society Directive. Part IV surveys human rights-related and
competition-related criticisms of the Commission's proposal. Part V
analyzes the adopted text of Article 17 with attention to the nature and
adequacy of revisions made to answer the criticisms outlined in PartIV.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sweeping changes are coming to copyright law in the European
Union. Following four years of negotiations, the European Parliament

in April 2019 approved the final text of the Digital Single Market (DSM)
Directive.' EU member states now have two years to transpose its
provisions into domestic law. 2 The new directive, which is the most
substantial change to EU copyright law in a generation, contains
provisions for enhancing cross-border access to content available
through digital subscription services, enabling new uses of copyrighted
works for education and research, and, most controversially,
"clarifying" the role of online services in the distribution of copyrighted
works. 3
Article 17 of the DSM Directive, a provision associated with the
last of these goals, is intended to address the so-called value
gap-the music industry's longstanding complaint that YouTube
undercompensates music rights holders for streams of user-uploaded
videos containing claimed copyrighted content.4 The text of the DSM
Directive nowhere mentions YouTube, but anyone versed in the
political economy of digital copyright knows that Article 17 was
designed specifically to make YouTube pay. The important question in
the wake of Article 17's adoption is who else will pay-and in what
ways.
This Article offers a focused examination of Article 17 as a public
law created to settle a private score between the music industry and
YouTube. Part II explains and critiques the "value gap" as a policy
rationale for altering the scope of generally applicable copyright safe
harbors. Part III breaks down the terms of the European Commission's
original proposal for DSM Directive Article 13, which later became
Article 17, in relation to existing provisions of the E-Commerce
Directive (ECD)5 and the Information Society (InfoSoc) Directive.6 Part
IV surveys criticisms of Article 13's mass licensing and technical
measures mandates related to fundamental rights and competition.
Part V analyzes the adopted text of Article 17 with attention to the

1.
Council Directive 2019/790, 2019 O.J. (L 130) (EU) [hereinafter "DSM Directive"].
2.
See id. at 125 (art. 29) (providing that transposition by Member States must occur by
June 7, 2021).
3.
See id. at 92 (recital 3) (summarizing the Directive's key provisions).
4.
See id. at 119 (art. 17) (governing "use of protected content by online content-sharing
service providers").
5.
Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 0.J. (L 178) (EC) [hereinafter "ECD"].
6.
Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) (EC) [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive"].
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nature and adequacy of the revisions that were made to answer the
criticisms outlined in Part IV.
II. SAFE HARBORS, YOUTUBE, AND THE "VALUE GAP"

The policy rationale for Article 17 comes directly from a music
industry lobbying campaign that began around 2015.7 The "value gap"
is a slogan that music industry trade groups created to sell policy
makers on the idea that copyright safe harbors are not a sound policy
choice for the whole internet but a legal loophole that allows YouTube
to unfairly exploit the music industry's valuable intellectual property.8
According to the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry
(IFPI) and other industry groups, safe harbors create a value gap
between what content-sharing services like YouTube pay per stream of
copyrighted music and what dedicated music streaming services like
Spotify pay.9 The fact that copyright law treats YouTube and Spotify
differently, they argue, distorts the digital music marketplace by
suppressing streaming royalty rates across the board. 10
The upshot of the value gap as a copyright policy proposition is
that music industry stakeholders want more money from YouTube, and
they want to reshape the law to get it. Simply put, they seek to redefine
the scope of existing copyright safe harbors in the European Union and
the United States to exclude YouTube from their protection. The
7.

See, e.g., INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., IFPI DIGITAL MusIc REPORT 2015

22-23
(2015),
https://www.ifpi.org/downloads/Digital-Music-Report-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N5C3-HQNL] [hereinafter IFPI]; Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. et al., Joint
Comments of the 'Music Community", U.S. Copyright Office Section 512 Study, Docket No.
2015-7, Appendix C, 5-6 (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Music-Community-Submission-in-re-DMCA-512-FINAL-7559445.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ8Z-XM87];
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Five Stubborn Truths About the Value Gap, MEDIUM
(Aug.
18,
2017),
https://www.riaa.com/medium-five-stubborn-truths-youtube-value-gap/
[https://perma.cc/F9B8-VCLM]; Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. & Nat'1 Music Publishers' Ass'n,
Comments in Response to Request of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinatorfor
Public Comments: Development of the Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement 4
(Nov. 13, 2018), https://torrentfreak.com/images/RIAA-IPEC-strategic-plan submission v11-1318.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WGR-Y9TW] [hereinafter RIAA & Nat'1 Music Publishers' Ass'n]. In the
European Commission's public information campaign for the DSM Directive, the Commission
routinely described Article 13/17 as a solution for the "value gap" without ever attributing the term
to music industry lobbyists. See, e.g., Press Release, European Comm'n, Questions & Answers: EU
Negotiators Reach a Breakthrough to Modernise Copyright Rules (Feb. 13, 2019), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO- 19-1151_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/5TCD-EMU9];
Press
Release, European Comm'n, Speech by Vice-President Ansip on Copyright at the Charles Clark
Memorial Lecture, London Book Fair (Apr. 10, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release SPEECH-18-3124 en.htm [https://perma.cc/VL5G-ANJJ].
8.
See IFPI, supra note 7, at 22-23 (explaining the "value gap").
Id. at 23.
9.
10.
Id.
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predicted effect of such a change is to force YouTube to renegotiate its
existing licenses with record labels and music publishers on terms more
favorable to the music industry. As explained in the pages that follow,
both the European Commission (the "Commission") and the European
Parliament embraced this solution, with potentially damaging
collateral consequences for the open internet, the expressive rights of
internet users, and the vast array of content-sharing businesses that
allow internet users to take part in the digital economy and digital
culture.
A. An Apples -to- Oranges Comparison
A major flaw in the logic of the value gap, albeit not one that
troubled the Commission, is that the music industry's asserted
equivalence between dedicated music streaming services like Spotify
and user-generated content (UGC) services like YouTube is false. Not
only is it false, it is false in a way that intentionally elides the policy
rationale for safe harbors. Safe harbors exist to limit liability and
provide certainty for online businesses that allow members of the public
to create and share content. They make it possible for the public to
access open online forums for creative expression and cultural
participation." Without them, such forums cannot manage the
operating risk inherent in hosting massive quantities of third-party
content.
Because Spotify and YouTube operate under different business
models, they don't face the same legal risks. Spotify is a closed
distribution platform; it directly chooses and controls the whole
universe of content it makes available to subscribers. It therefore knows
exactly what content will be available on its service at any given time.
No random subscriber in Paris-France or Texas-can upload a cat
video to Spotify at three o'clock in the morning on a Sunday. YouTube,
by contrast, is open to all comers all the time.
Open services like YouTube face uncertain and continuous
exposure to legal claims arising from their users' activity, including
copyright infringement. Safe harbors were created because policy
makers knew that infringement is inevitable on open, public-facing
platforms. Closed services like Spotify don't enjoy the protection of safe
harbors, not because they are being treated unfairly but because they
11.
Cf. Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 518 (2017) ("The openness of internet platforms has been a powerful
democratizing force in cultural production. The lack of central planning and prior restraint leaves
[amateur creators] to compete for attention on equal terms with more traditional entertainment
industry offerings.").
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don't need it. Considering the nature of the services in question, the
comparison at the heart of the value gap campaign is inapt.
Legal exposure arising from copyright-infringing UGC is
profound for any US-based service operating at internet scale, because
US copyright law permits recovery of statutory damages of up to
$150,000 per infringed work. 12 To give a concrete example of how
quickly those damages can add up, Viacom claimed over a billion dollars
in statutory damages when it sued YouTube-then still a startup-in
2007.13 Copyright safe harbors exist so that online businesses hosting
UGC can raise capital and operate. Without them, UGC-based online
business models would be unsustainable for all but megaservices like
YouTube and Facebook, which have accrued sufficient wealth to
withstand eight-figure legal judgments and the cost of taking whatever
measures are necessary to avoid them.
As the dominance of YouTube and Facebook draws increased
regulatory scrutiny, it is important to remember that intermediary safe
harbors do not just benefit the internet's platform giants. Safe harbors
are essential to the internet's interactive architecture. They are
indispensable for the wide swath of service providers that keep the
internet's application layer diverse, offering the public opportunities for
creativity and conversation beyond the confines of the major platforms.
The danger of the value gap campaign from a policy perspective is its
narrow focus on the impact of a particular service, YouTube, on a
particular industry, recorded music.

B. The ECD's Article 14 Storage Safe Harbor
The safe harbor in the crosshairs of the value gap campaign is
the storage safe harbor in ECD Article 14.14 ECD Article 14 conditions
safe harbor for storage providers on their not having knowledge of
infringement and on their removing or disabling access to infringing
content when they learn about it, whether through notice from a rights
holder or otherwise. 15 ECD Article 14 also conditions safe harbor on a
provider's not having control over its users' illegal activities. 16 A

12.
See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (providing for statutory damages of up to $150,000 per work in
cases of willful infringement).
13.
Jonathan Stempel, Google, Viacom Settle Landmark YouTube Lawsuit, REUTERS
(Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-viacom-lawsuit/google-viacom-settlelandmark-youtube-lawsuit-idUSBREA2H11220140318
[https://perma.cc/2Y94-3VV2].
Google
acquired YouTube for $1.65 billion in 2006. Id.
14.
ECD, supra note 5, at 13 (art. 14).
Id.
15.
16.
Id.

2020]

HOWMUSIC HACKED EU COPYRIGHTREFORM

329

provider's knowledge of infringement can be based on notice or,
alternatively, on facts and circumstances from which infringing activity
is apparent.1 7 The copyright enforcement framework embodied in ECD
Article 14 is reactive; acquiring knowledge of a particular infringement
serves as a trigger for action on the provider's part.18 As a general
matter, actionable knowledge comes from notices, and notices come
from rights holders.
The ECD's reactive notice-and-takedown framework puts the
burden of monitoring for infringement on rights holders. Accordingly,
ECD Article 15 provides that member states cannot condition safe
harbor for any eligible service provider on a "general monitoring
obligation."1 9 ECD Article 15 would thus seem to prevent member states
from requiring service providers to use technical measures-e.g.,
automated content recognition (ACR) systems like YouTube's Content
ID-to continuously monitor all of the content their users upload, with
an eye to preventing infringements.
At the same time, however, ECD Article 14 provides that a
rights holder may seek an injunction, as permitted by national law,
"requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an
infringement." 2 0 Whereas terminating an infringement is consistent
with a solely reactive posture on the part of a service provider,
preventing an infringement is not and would appear to entail active and
ongoing monitoring for infringing content. It is thus challenging to
reconcile the availability of preventive injunctions under ECD Article
14 with the prohibition on general monitoring obligations in ECD
Article 15.21 As discussed in Section III.B below, courts in the European
Union have grappled with this tension for years.

17.
Id.
18.
See generally Martin Husovec, The Promises of Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement:
Takedown or Staydown? Which Is Superior? And Why?, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53 (2018)
(providing a taxonomy of enforcement models and explaining notice-and-takedown procedures
under the ECD and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
19.
ECD, supra note 5, at 13 (art. 15).
20.
Id. at 13 (art. 14) (emphasis added).
21.
As part of the DSM Platform Consultation, the Commission sponsored a report on
intermediary liability. Its authors concluded that the scope of ECD Articles 14 and 15 requires
clarification as applied to today's services, which have features and architectures that did not exist
when the ECD was adopted. See JORIS VAN HOBOKEN ET AL., HOSTING INTERMEDIARY SERVICES
AND ILLEGAL CONTENT ONLINE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 14 ECD IN LIGHT OF
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ONLINE SERVICE LANDSCAPE, REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION DG
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, CONTENT & TECHNOLOGY 6, 46 (2018).
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C. How Content ID Changed the Game
In
2007,
when
YouTube
introduced
Content
ID,
notice-and-takedown was the settled legal framework within which
YouTube and rights holders operated when it came to policing
copyrights. Because YouTube had no legal obligation to monitor user
uploads for infringing content, it made Content ID available to selected
corporate partners on terms of its own choosing. 22
Content ID works by creating a unique digital fingerprint of
every uploaded user file and then using that fingerprint to query a
database populated with fingerprints of reference files provided by
rights holders. 23 If any portion of an uploaded file matches content in a
reference file, the user's upload is automatically claimed for the rights
holder who submitted the reference file. 24 The rights holder elects when
submitting individual reference files whether they want to monetize or
block algorithmically claimed user uploads. 25 For claimed videos the
rights holder elects to monetize, the uploader's share of ad revenue from
views of the video is diverted to the rights holder. 26 For claimed videos
the rights holder elects to block, no revenue is generated for anyone.
Content ID offers participating rights holders two major benefits
over notice-and-takedown: (1) it continuously monitors YouTube
uploads for rights holders' copyright-protected content, thereby
relieving them of the hassle of sending bulk notices; and (2) it enables
them to authorize and monetize user infringements instead of blocking
them. 27 With Content ID, YouTube created an entirely new revenue
stream for rights holders: automated, real-time licensing of initially
unauthorized amateur uses of copyrighted content. Before Content ID,

&

22.
See Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, New Weapon in the Web War over Piracy,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/19/technology/19video.html
[https://perma.cc/N4WU-765D] (reporting on media companies' negative reaction to YouTube's
conditioning access to Content ID on the execution of broader licensing agreements).
23.
See YouTube Creators, YouTube Content ID, YOUTUBE (Sept. 28, 2010),
http://youtube.com/watch?v=9g2Ul2SsRns
[https://perma.cc/8L2G-DEGL];
see also Evan
Engstrom & Nick Feamster, The Limits of Filtering: A Look at the Functionality
Shortcomings
of
Content
Detection
Tools,
ENGINE
13-14
(Mar.
2017),
https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/571681753c44d835a440c8b5/t/58d058712994ca536bbfa47a/
1490049138881/FilteringPaperWebsite.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PAZ-UVTW] (explaining the acoustical fingerprinting technology that underlies Content ID).
24.
See YouTube Creators, supra note 23.
25.

Id.

26.
Id.
27.
Google, Inc., How Google Fights Piracy, GOOGLE 24-25 (Nov. 2018), https://storage.googleapis.com/gweb-uniblog-publish-prod/documents/HowGoogleFightsPiracy_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BBW4-JL46]. Over 90 percent of claimed videos in Content ID are monetized
rather than blocked. Id. at 14.
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there was no practical, scalable way for rights holders to track, claim,
and monetize users' infringements on YouTube. Takedown was the
only game in town, and it earned rights holders nothing. Content ID
revealed the utility of ACR technology not just for blocking
unauthorized uses of copyrighted works but for licensing them at
scale. It should thus come as no surprise that ACR-a "technical
measure"-is integral to the music industry's desired policy solution to
the value gap.
To get access to Content ID and the new market it unlocked, the
major record labels and music publishers agreed to license their
catalogs to YouTube in return for undisclosed compensation, including
a cut of ad revenue from claimed, monetized videos. 28 A lesser-known
fact is that the major labels also negotiated for equity stakes in
YouTube that were reportedly valued at up to $50 million. 2 9 In addition,

the industry derives other value from YouTube. Not only do rights
holders monetize claimed content in user-uploaded videos, they operate
and monetize official YouTube channels for their own artists.

30

Some of

popular. 31 Rights

them are among the platform's most
holders also use
YouTube to find and recruit new talent, including superstars like Justin
Bieber, Carly Rae Jepson, Shawn Mendes, Alessia Cara, and the
Weeknd. 32 It is unclear how, if at all, the benefits of talent promotion
and discovery figure into the industry's value gap accounting.
Over time, the music industry's relationship with YouTube has
been lucrative. From October 2017 to September 2018, YouTube
reported that it paid more than $1.8 billion in ad revenue to music
industry partners. 33 From the music industry's viewpoint, however, the
deal is not lucrative enough. 34 The IFPI claims in its value gap talking
points that for every twenty dollars Spotify returns to the music

28.
Andrew Ross Sorkin & Jeff Leeds, Music Companies Grab a Share of the YouTube
Sale, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/19/technology/19net.html
[https://perma.cc/6VR9-74RK].
29.
Id.
30.
See Todd Spangler, YouTube Will Merge Vevo Channel Subscribers into Unified
'Official'MusicArtist Accounts, VARIETY (Jan. 23, 2018, 12:27 PM), https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/youtube-vevo-music-channels-consolidation-official-artists- 1202674125/
[https://perma.cc/DM9P-GSHE] (reporting on YouTube's consolidation of Vevo artist channels and
unofficial artist channels into Official Artist Channels).
31.
Id.
32.
See Isis Briones, 12MajorArtists Who Got Their Start on YouTube, TEENVOGUE (Mar.
29,
2016),
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/best-artists-discovered-on-youtube
[https://perma.cc/AK5A-PKSC].
33.
See Google, Inc., supra note 27, at 21.
34.
See, e.g., RIAA & Nat'l Music Publishers' Ass'n, supra note 7, at 4 (asserting that
YouTube licenses content "at a fraction of market value").
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industry, YouTube returns only a dollar. 35 Neither side's claims about
who pays what to whom are verifiable. It is indisputable, however, that
the music industry's annual revenues have been increasing
dramatically-with copyright safe harbors fully intact-since its trade
associations began messaging about the value gap. 36 In 2018, the

Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) reported that
sound-recording revenues rose 12 percent to $9.8 billion, reaching their
highest level in ten years. 37 Streaming revenues grew by 30 percent. 38
The National Music Publishers Association (NMPA) reported that
music-publishing revenues rose to $3.3 billion, an increase of 11.8
percent over the previous year. 39 In short, the industry has rebounded
from the hit it took during the Napster years, and streaming has been
the game changer. 40
D. What the Music Industry Wanted (and Got)
Rights holders have long argued that YouTube should be legally
required to give them access to Content ID with no strings attached.4 1
Viacom made precisely that argument when it sued YouTube in the
United States in 2007, but the court saw no legal basis for it. Citing
section 512(m) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which

35.
Roy Trakin, IFPI Report Finds Streaming Continues to Rise, YouTube Dominates
Online Listening, VARIETY (Oct. 9, 2018, 11:39 AM), https://variety.com/2018/music/news/ifpi-report-streaming-youtube-online-listening- 1202974035/ [https://perma.cc/L58M-HVK].
36.
See Joshua P. Friedlander, News and Notes on 2015 RIAA Shipment and
Revenue Statistics, RECORDING INDUS. ASS'N Am. (2015), https://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RIAA-2015-Year-End-shipments-memo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HPJ7-SS7G].
According to the RIAA, "2015 was a milestone year for streaming music." Id. For 2015, the RIAA
reported $2.4 billion in total streaming revenue, offsetting combined losses that year from sales of
digital downloads and physical formats. Id. Of that total, $1.2 billion came from paid streaming
subscriptions, up 52 percent from 2014. Id. $385 million came from ad-supported streaming, up
from $295 million in 2014. Id.
37.
Jem Aswad, U.S. Music Industry Posts Third Straight Year ofDouble-Digit Growth as
Streaming Soars 30%, VARIETY (Feb. 28, 2019, 10:55 AM), https://variety.com/2019/biz/news/u-smusic-industry-posts-third-straight-year-of-double-digit-growth-as-streaming-soars-301203152036/ [https://perma.cc/3AU3-L4GP].
Id.
38.
39.
Ed Christman, NMPA Announces 11.8% Member Revenue Growth to $3.3B at Annual
Meeting, BILLBOARD (June 12, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/85 15757/nmpamember-revenue-growth-david-israelite-annual-meeting [https://perma.cc/DQ4D-JWY7].
40.
Sam Wolfson, 'We've Got More Money Swirling Around': How Streaming Saved the
Music Industry, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2018/apr/24/weve-got-more-money-swirling-around-how-streaming-saved-the-music-industry
[https://perma.cc/Q2TZ-6B3M].
41.
See Stone & Helft, supra note 22 (reporting on media companies' demands that
YouTube implement audiovisual fingerprinting technology).
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is the US equivalent of ECD Article 15, the court held that YouTube
could not be denied safe harbor under section 512(c)-the equivalent of
ECD Article 14-for "refusing to provide access to mechanisms by which
[it] affirmatively monitors its own network." 42
Because safe harbors have not historically been conditioned on
providers' giving rights holders free access to the technology they use to
monitor content on their services, rights holders have had to negotiate
for access. The alternative has been notice-and-takedown, which is
cumbersome and leaves a lot of money (i.e., ad revenue) on the table.
Because YouTube has had no legal duty to monitor for infringement, it
has been able to use Content ID as a bargaining chip in licensing
negotiations with music rights holders. Rights holders want policy
makers in both the European Union and the United States to take that
bargaining chip away, thereby-they believe-dramatically raising
licensing rates and closing the value gap. To that end, rights holders
have advocated narrowing the ECD and DMCA storage safe harbors
and requiring all UGC-sharing services to use ACR technology as a
copyright management tool for their benefit.
Despite the false equivalence at the heart of the value gap
campaign, the European Commission was persuaded that YouTube's
entitlement to the protection of the ECD storage safe harbor has not
been conducive to "a fair sharing of value" 4 3 for use of recorded music
on the platform. In its proposal to Parliament, the Commission was
frank about the intended redistributive effects of Article 13:
By improving the bargaining position of authors and performers and the control
rightholders have on the use of their copyright-protected content, the proposal will
have a positive impact on copyright as a property right . . . . This positive impact will
be reinforced by the measures to improve licensing practices, and ultimately
44
rightholders' revenues.

To accomplish its redistributive goal-a wealth transfer from YouTube
to music industry stakeholders-the Commission proposed Article 13.
III. ARTICLE 13: THE COM1ISSION'S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL

In the Commission's September 2016 proposal, Article 13 swept
broadly, covering all "information society service providers storing and
giving access to large amounts of works and other subject-matter
42.
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018); Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 40-41 (2d Cir.
2012); ECD, supra note 5, at 13 (art. 14-15).
43.
Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, at 3, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter
"DSM Directive Proposal"].
44.
Id. at 9.
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uploaded by their users."4 5 All such providers were to "take measures

to ensure the functioning of [licensing] agreements concluded with
rightholders ... or to prevent the availability on their services of works
or other subject-matter identified by rightholders through cooperation
with service providers."4 6
The recitals to the original Article 13 summarized the provision
as embodying two requirements: (1) a plenary licensing requirement for
any provider falling outside the scope of the ECD's Article 14 storage
safe harbor, and (2) an infringement-prevention (or blocking)
requirement applicable to all providers-even those eligible for the
ECD Article 14 safe harbor.4 7 Positioning Article 13 as the policy
solution to the value gap, the Commission implicitly targeted YouTube,
contemplating that it and other covered providers would use technical
measures (e.g., Content ID) to recognize copyrighted content in user
uploads and then monetize or block the videos containing that content,
according to the relevant rights holder's predetermined preference.
This Part unpacks Article 13's original licensing and technical
measures requirements and explains how they fit with existing
provisions of the ECD and the InfoSoc Directive, as the Court of Justice
for the European Union (CJEU) has interpreted those provisions.
A. The Licensing Requirement
The licensing requirement in Article 13 exempted any provider
eligible for the ECD's Article 14 storage safe harbor, which covers
service providers that engage in "storage of information provided by a
recipient of the service . . . at the request of [the] recipient."4 8 The CJEU
has not yet decided whether YouTube is eligible for safe harbor under
ECD Article 14. US courts, however, have concluded in multiple cases
that video-sharing services, including YouTube, are eligible for the
DMCA's section 512(c) storage safe harbor.4 9
Rights holders believe that YouTube should be ineligible for safe
harbor because playback and other core functions of the service (i.e.,
search and recommendations) are "active" and therefore fall outside the
limited definition of "storage" in ECD Article 14, which they would limit

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
Recordings,
Int'l, Inc. v.

Id. at 29 (art. 13).
Id.
Id. at 20 (recital 38).
ECD, supra note 5, at 13 (art. 14).
See Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 99 (2d Cir. 2016); UMG
Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1036 (9th Cir. 2013); Viacom
YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 41 (2d Cir. 2012).
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to purely "passive" or neutral functions.5 0 They also argue that
YouTube's video playback functionality-the
service's defining
feature-constitutes "communication to the public" within the meaning
of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive and therefore requires a license
from rights holders. 51 These issues are now pending before the CJEU in
two cases: LF v. Google, the November 2018 referral of a German case
captioned Peterson v. YouTube, and Puls 4 TV v. YouTube, a July 2019
referral from the high court of Austria. 52
In its original proposal for Article 13, the Commission embraced
rights holders' views on both ECD Article 14 and InfoSoc Directive
Article 3(1). With respect to the scope of ECD Article 14, the
Commission wrote that eligibility hinges on "whether the service
provider plays an active role, including by optimizing the presentation
of the uploaded works . . . or promoting them." 53 With respect to the
scope of InfoSoc Directive Article 3(1), the proposal stated that services
providing public access to copyrighted works "[go] beyond the mere
provision of physical facilities and [perform] an act of communication to
the public."54 All such services, the Commission announced, must
license the works their users stream or be liable for infringement.55
The remainder of this Section considers the extent to which the
Commission's perspectives on ECD Article 14 and InfoSoc Directive
Article 3(1) accurately restate or "clarify" existing CJEU case law, as
the Commission claimed in its proposal.

50.
See IFPI, supra note 7, at 5 ("Laws that were designed to exempt passive hosting
companies from liability in the early days of the internet-so-called 'safe harbours'-should never
be allowed to exempt active digital music services from having to fairly negotiate licences with
rightholders."). This argument has repeatedly failed in the United States as applied to the storage
safe harbor in section 512(c) of the DMCA. See, e.g., Viacom, 676 F.3d at 39. US courts have held
specifically that YouTube's playback, search, and recommendation functions do not disqualify it
from safe harbor. See id. (holding that "safe harbor extends to software functions performed for
the purpose of facilitating access to user-stored material" and that limiting safe harbor to purely
passive" functions "would eviscerate the protection afforded to service providers by § 512(c)").
51.
See Joint Statement from IFPI et al., Joint Statement on Transfer of Value-Value
Gap, to Axel Voss, Member of the European Parliament (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.ifpi.org/downloads/ValueGapJointStatement_04102017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C7M-RJR6] (urging EU policy
makers to adopt the position that platforms providing users with access to copyrighted works
engage in communication to the public).
52.
Case C-682/18, LF v. Google, LLC, 2018 E.C.R., ¶¶ 1-2; Case C-500/19, Puls 4 TV
GmbH & Co. KG v. YouTube LLC, 2019 E.C.R., ¶¶ 1-4.
DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 43, at 20 (recital 38).
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
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1. ECD Article 14 in the CJEU
The CJEU's case law on the scope of ECD Article 14 is somewhat
mixed. As Jaani Riordan points out, "[t]he dividing line that separates
protected acts of storage from unprotected acts of intervening in content
can be difficult to discern."5 6 Two trademark cases support the
Commission's narrow reading, but a more directly analogous (and
roughly contemporaneous) copyright case doesn't. The trademark cases
are Google France v. Louis Vuitton57 and L'Ordal v. eBay,68 both
involving claims of infringement by means of Google's AdWords
program. The copyright case is SABAM v. Netlogf 9 in which a Belgian
collecting society for music rights holders sued a now-defunct social
media service.
In Google France, the CJEU considered whether Google could
claim the storage safe harbor with respect to AdWords, which lets
advertisers run ads against Google Search results for selected keywords
in user search queries. Louis Vuitton sued Google over the use of Louis
Vuitton's trademarks as keywords.6 0 The CJEU interpreted ECD
Article 14 eligibility to depend on "whether the role played by th[e]
service provider is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely
technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or
control of the data which it stores." 6 1 The court held that setting
payment terms, providing information to users, and displaying ads
triggered by search terms corresponding to user-selected keywords
were sufficiently "passive" and automatic to fall within the scope of the
safe harbor. 62 By contrast, it held, drafting content for ads and selecting
keywords for advertisers were too "active." 63
In L'Ordal, the CJEU again applied an active-passive test to
determine the applicability of ECD Article 14. L'Or6al sued eBay for
using its trademarks as keywords in AdWords, resulting in the display
of sponsored links to eBay listings alongside search results for L'Or6al's
branded products.6 4 The CJEU again held that eligibility for ECD
Article 14 turns on the nature of the defendant's relationship to user
content. Article 14 does not apply "where the service provider, instead

56.

JAANI RIORDAN, THE LIABILITY OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES 401 (2016).

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Case C-236/08, Google Fr. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2009 E.C.R. 159.
Case C-324/09, L'Or6al SAv. eBay Int'l AG, 2010 E.C.R. 474.
Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV, 2012 E.C.R. 85.
Google Fr., 2009 E.C.R. 159, ¶ 37.
Id. ¶ 114.
Id. ¶ 116.
Id. ¶ 118.
Case C-324/09, L'Or6al SAv. eBay Int'l AG, 2010 E.C.R. 474, ¶¶ 38-39.
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of confining itself to providing that service neutrally by a merely
technical and automatic processing of the data provided by its
customers, plays an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of,
or control over, those data."6 5 Analyzing eflay's advertising through the

active-passive lens, the court determined that offering user-provided
goods for sale, setting terms of service, receiving remuneration for
service, and providing general information to users are safe-harbored
activities, but "optimising the presentation of . . offers for sale ... or
promoting them" is not. 66
Scholars have criticized the court's reasoning in Google France
and L'Ordal, because it effectively guts the storage safe harbor for
today's most popular and useful public-facing online services. 6 7
Moreover, the CJEU's narrow reading of ECD Article 14 is arguably
rooted in a misapplication of an ECD recital intended to apply only to
ECD Articles 12 and 13, which cover transmission and caching,
respectively. 68 In the wake of these decisions, which apply the
active-passive test to services claiming safe harbor under ECD Article
14, only the most access-restrictive and feature-poor cloud storage
services can realistically qualify for protection.
The CJEU precedent more clearly applicable to a
content-sharing service like YouTube is SABAM v. Netlog.69 The
defendant social media platform allowed users to upload and share
video clips and other types of content, including photos and music. 7 0
SABAM sued, alleging that users had uploaded content that infringed
copyrights in its music repertoire.7 1 Notably, SABAM didn't dispute,
and the court apparently saw no reason to question, Netlog's eligibility
for safe harbor under ECD Article 14.72 That legal conclusion was
simply taken for granted by all involved.
65.

Id.

¶

66.

Id.

¶ 116.

113.

67.
See Case C-236/08, Google Fr. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2009 E.C.R. 159; L'Or6al SA,
2010 E.C.R. 474; Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon, Internet Intermediariesas Responsible Actors? Why It
Is Time to Rethink the E-Commerce Directive as Well..., in THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF ONLINE
SERVICE PROVIDERS 286-88 (Mariarosaria Taddeo & Luciano Floridi eds., 2017) (arguing that the
active-passive dichotomy for interpreting the scope of Article 14 more or less eviscerates the safe
harbor because all services are to some extent "active" in their handling of users' data).
68.
RIORDAN, supra note 56, at 402 ("The neutrality requirement probably stems from a
mistaken reading of recital (42) (which applies only to caching and transmission)."). See also
L'Or6al SA, 2010 E.C.R. 474, ¶¶ 138-42 (expressing doubt that recital 42 applies to hosting
providers).
69.
C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV, 2012 E.C.R. 85.
70.
Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
Id. ¶¶ 18, 21.
71.
Id. ¶ 27 ("[I]t is not in dispute that the owner of an online social networking
72.
platform . . . stores information provided by the users of that platform, relating to their profile, on
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Is a different conclusion warranted for YouTube? Inasmuch as
Netlog's users maintained their own profiles and were able to share
music and video clips, Netlog had at least some functionality in common
with YouTube. Because the court did not discuss Netlog's architecture
in any detail, and because the service no longer exists, it is impossible
to do a side-by-side comparison. Netlog does establish, however, that
the Commission could have looked to CJEU authority other than the
keyword advertising cases for guidance about the applicability of ECD
Article 14 to a social media platform accused of infringing music
copyrights. Instead, it chose two search-related trademark cases that
took a very narrow view of ECD Article 14's scope. In doing so, the
Commission put a thumb on the scale for rights holders.
2. InfoSoc Directive Article 3(1) in the CJEU
Existing copyright case law from the CJEU more clearly
supports the Commission's broad reading of "communication to the
public" under InfoSoc Directive Article 3(1). Article 3(1) requires
member states to give authors "the exclusive right to authorise or
prohibit any communication to the public of their works, by wire or
wireless means, including the making available to the public of their
works." 73 The InfoSoc Directive does not define "communication to the
public" but requires an interpretation that is consistent with the policy
goal of strongly protecting authors and remunerating them for use of
their works.74
The case that is most closely on point is Brein v. Ziggo, 75
involving the Pirate Bay, the infamous search engine for peer-to-peer
torrent files. The question presented was whether the Pirate Bay
engaged in communication to the public by indexing and categorizing
links to copyrighted works so that users could find and share them. In
its analysis, the CJEU distinguished between activities that count as
an "act of communication" and those that involve "the mere provision of
services for enabling or making a communication."7 6 To determine
on which side of that line the Pirate Bay fell, the CJEU
cited a rule developed in previously decided cases involving

its servers, and that it is thus a hosting service provider within the meaning of Article 14."). The
live issue in the case, discussed below in Section III.B, was whether the preventive injunction
SABAM sought under ECD Article 14 was too broad in light of ECD Article 15's prohibition on
general monitoring obligations.
InfoSoc Directive, supra note 6, at 16 (art. 3(1)).
73.
74.
Case C-610/15, Stichting Breinv. Ziggo, 2017 E.C.R. 456, ¶¶ 21-22.
Id. ¶¶ 1-2.
75.
Id. ¶¶ 3, 26.
76.
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of clickable links to protected works

published without any access restrictions on another site affords users
of the first site direct access to those works" sufficient to establish an
act of communication.7 7
Despite recognizing that third parties provided all of the links
on the Pirate Bay, the CJEU held that direct liability was appropriate.7 8
By indexing third-party links to content that it knew to be infringing,
and by making those links searchable, the Pirate Bay enabled users to
share copyrighted files that they would otherwise either not be able to
share or have difficulty sharing. In doing so, the court concluded, the
Pirate Bay itself communicated those works within the meaning of
InfoSoc Directive Article 3(1).79

Moreover, the court held, the Pirate Bay went beyond "the mere
provision of services" by classifying the available works under different
subject matter categories, having employees check to make sure works
were properly classified, deleting obsolete or corrupt torrent files, and
filtering some content.8 0 In the court's analysis, the array of
access-facilitating functionality that makes the Pirate Bay useful for
finding shared third-party content also makes it liable for unauthorized
communication to the public. The CJEU's catalog of the ways in which
the Pirate Bay exceeded the mere provision of services for purposes of
Article 3(1) calls to mind its application of the active-passive test to
Google and eBay in the ECD Article 14 cases.
3. The Commission's Interpretations of ECD Article 14
and InfoSoc Directive Article 3(1)
By ratifying rights holder arguments concerning the narrow
scope of ECD Article 14 and the broad scope of InfoSoc Directive Article
3(1), the Commission's proposal for Article 13 answered unsettled legal
questions about YouTube that are pending before the CJEU in LF and
Puls 4 TV. 81 As far as the Commission was concerned, to the extent that
a provider makes UGC videos searchable (thereby "optimizing" them)
and recommends them to other users (thereby "promoting" them), it is

Id. ¶ 32.
77.
Id. ¶¶ 36, 50.
78.
79.
Id. ¶¶ 36-39.
80.
Id. ¶ 38.
81.
See Case C-682/18, LF v. Google, LLC, 2018 E.C.R. (referring to the CJEU questions
about YouTube's eligibility for the ECD Article 14 storage safe harbor and its liability for
communication to the public under InfoSoc Directive Article 3(1)); Case C-500/19, Puls 4 TV GmbH
& Co. KG v. YouTube LLC, 2019 E.C.R. (referring the same issues as those being litigated in LF).
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too active to qualify for Article 14's storage safe harbor. 82 And to the
extent that a provider allows playback of UGC videos, it goes beyond
"the mere provision of physical facilitieS" 83 and gives the public access
to copyrighted works, thereby communicating them to the public within
the meaning of InfoSoc Directive Article 3(1).
Implicitly, the Commission's proposal for Article 13 ticked all of
the boxes on the music industry's "value gap" wish list: it expelled
YouTube from ECD Article 14's storage safe harbor; it made YouTube
liable under InfoSoc Directive Article 3(1) for unauthorized
communication to the public; and it mandated that YouTube obtain
licenses for all of the content it hosts, including all of the UGC that
record labels and music publishers currently monetize through Content
ID on terms the industry resents. The Commission's intended result
was to close the value gap by tuning safe harbors in a way that would
put YouTube in a weaker position from which to negotiate future
licensing deals with major music industry stakeholders.
B. The (Technical) Measures Requirement
The Commission described the measures requirement in
proposed Article 13 as necessary to "ensure the functioning of
[licensing] agreements .

.

. or to prevent the availability" of copyrighted

works on covered services. 8 4 The contemplated measures were technical
ones, "such as the use of effective content recognition technologies."8 5
The Commission's proposal was silent as to what systems might qualify,
but the impact assessment for the DSM Directive contains an appendix
(Annex 12) that is chock-full of relevant information, including a vendor
list.86

As discussed in Part II above, Content ID is the paradigmatic
example of a content recognition (or filtering) system that can
automatically claim content on behalf of a rights holder and either
monetize or block it, as the rights holder specifies. As Article 13
required, Content ID can both ensure the functioning of licensing
82.
See DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 43, at 20 (recital 38) (stating that for purposes
of Article 14 "it is necessary to verify whether the service provider plays an active role, including
by optimising the presentation of the uploaded works or subject-matter or promoting them").
See id. (stating that it is an act of communication to the public to "store and provide
83.
access to the public to copyright protected works").
84.
Id. at 29 (art. 13).
Id.
85.
86.
See Commission Impact Assessment on the Modernisation of EU Copyright Rules,
at 167-72, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/impact-assessment-modernisation-eu-copyright-rules
[https://perma.cc/7KZA-UN25]
[hereinafter "Impact Assessment"].
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agreements (i.e., by tracking views of claimed, monetized videos) and
prevent the availability of unauthorized copyrighted works (i.e., by
blocking videos that rights holders claim but choose not to monetize).
Besides
Google,
the
only
other
major
player
in
the
ACR-for-copyright-management market is Audible Magic, a US-based
private firm.8 7 YouTube initially licensed digital fingerprinting
technology from Audible Magic, but Google ultimately decided to build
its own proprietary system.8 8 Confusingly, both firms now refer to their
systems as Content ID.89
Google doesn't license Content ID for third-party use, but
Audible Magic markets ACR as a service to universities and social
media platforms.9 0 Its growing list of social media clients includes
Facebook, Vimeo, Spinrilla, SoundCloud, DailyMotion, Twitch, and
Tumblr. 91 Seeing an extraordinary business opportunity, Audible Magic
lobbied aggressively for mandatory content filters during the public
consultation that preceded the Commission's proposal-and throughout
the remainder of the DSM Directive policy-making process. 92 On
message with music industry trade associations, it submitted a slide
deck to the Commission, explicitly positioning its technology as a
solution to the value gap. 93 In 2017, it published a promotional video on

87.
See
Company,
AUDIBLE
MAGIC,
https://www.audiblemagic.com/company/
[https://perma.cc/QY2M-UJ4Q].
88.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Audible Magic Corporation in Support of Neither Party at
1-3, Viacom Int'lv. YouTube, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 10-3270) (stating that YouTube was
Audible Magic's customer for ACR technology beginning in 2007).
89.
The two firms are embroiled in a dispute over trademark rights in the "Content ID"
name. See Audible Magic Pursues Trademark Case Against Google, Bus. WIRE (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170110006413/en/
[https://perma.cc/73CX-EU6K].
Audible Magic claims that it is the rightful owner of the trademark and has filed a petition with
the US Patent and Trademark Office to cancel Google's federal registration of the mark. Id. The
cancellation proceeding was pending when this Article went to press.
90.
See Press Release, Audible Magic Corp., CopySense@ Appliance 1OG Automates
DMCA Notice Reduction for Campus IT Networks (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.audiblemagic.com/2015/02/03/audible-magic-introduces-upgraded-dmea-tool-for-colleges-and-universities/ [https://perma.cc/NY4L-M3Z2] (listing available products and services).
91.
See Home, AUDIBLE MAGIC, https://www.audiblemagic.com/ [https://perma.cc/5FTSL2ZP].
92.
See Annex I - Gestdem 2017/4050: List ofDocuments, COM (2017) 4050 (Apr. 9, 2017),
https://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/4465/response/14429/attach/5/Annex%20%2O 0 Gestdem % 202017% 2 04050%2Ov3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RVH7-S8F9]
(collecting,
in response to an open records request, communications relating to Audible Magic's services
from Audible Magic to various European Commission and EU officials, including the
Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology).
Id. at 23.
93.
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Vimeo, touting its system as an easy, accurate, and affordable Article
13 compliance tool.9 4

Recital 39 of the Commission's proposal made it clear that the
Commission intended "measures" in Article 13 to mean a content
recognition

and

monetization

system

like

Content

ID. 95

The

Commission contemplated that service providers would be accountable
to rights holders with respect to their choice of technology and would be
obliged to provide rights holders with performance statistics and
analytics on an ongoing basis. 96 Rights holders' sole obligation would be
to give providers reference files-"necessary data" for content matching
and automated claiming.9 7 Under the Commission's proposal, the
expense of implementing and maintaining technical measures was to
fall entirely on service providers-a stark departure from the ECD's
assignment of monitoring obligations to rights holders.
Article 13's technical measures requirement was precisely what
the music industry wanted. During the public consultation preceding
the DSM Directive's drafting, industry trade groups demanded that
providers be required to deploy technical measures as a precondition for
claiming safe harbor under ECD Article 14. For example, the British
trade association UK Music-which represents record labels, music
publishers, and concert promoters-filed comments referencing
Content ID specifically:
The duty of care under the system provided in Articles 12-15 ECD needs to be
clarified so that online platforms have to apply measures to bring to an end (and to
prevent) further infringements. . . . A duty of care should include obligations to
employ software to enable identification of copyright content. Solutions can be based
on technology which is readily available such as the Content ID software
98
programme.

The ECD does permit member states to impose duties of care on
storage providers "in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal
94.
Audible Magic Corp., Audible Magic Content ID for Compliance and Monetization in
Europe, VIMEO (Jan. 10, 2017), https://vimeo.com/198929871 [https://perma.cc/X7QM-V39T].
95.
See DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 43, at 20 (recital 39) ("Collaboration between
information society service providers ... and rightholders is essential for the functioning
of ... content recognition technologies.").
96.
See id. ("[T]he services should in particular provide rightholders with information on
the type of technologies used, the way they are operated and their success rate for the recognition
of rightholders' content. Those technologies should also allow rightholders to get information from
the information society service providers on the use of their content covered by an agreement.").
97.
See id. (stating that "rightholders should provide the necessary data to allow the
services to identify their content").
98.
UK Music, Public Consultationon the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online
Intermediaries, Data and Cloud Computing and the Collaborative Economy, EUR. COMMISSION
7-8 (Dec. 21, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/information-society/newsroom/image/document/20167/uk-music_14048.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN57-8XGA].
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activities."99 Such duties are limited, though, by ECD Article 15. As
discussed above in Part II, ECD Article 15 prohibits member states
from conditioning safe harbor on a general monitoring obligation. At the
same time, the ECD does allow member states to impose monitoring
obligations "in a specific case."10 0
Article 13's technical measures requirement was difficult to
reconcile with ECD Article 15. Proponents argued that the required
measures amounted only to permissible specific monitoring for a closed
universe of works designated by rights holders. As described above,
however, Content ID and Audible Magic both work by screening every
piece of user-uploaded content in real time against an
always-expanding universe of reference files. No file escapes the
system's surveillance. If such functionality does not amount to general
monitoring, it is hard to imagine what would. The argument that ACR
systems like Content ID perform only specific monitoring strains
credulity in light of the fact that Audible Magic's reference database
already contains ten million files and is growing at the rate of three
hundred thousand files per month. 10 1 The Commission's proposal
altogether ignored the obvious tension between Article 13 and ECD
Article 15.102

The CJEU has addressed the legality of permanent filtering
mandates in copyright cases involving judicial injunctions. In Scarlet
Extended v. SABAM, 103 it held that ECD Article 15 prevents a court
from ordering an internet access provider to continuously and
permanently filter all traffic transiting its network for the purpose of
preventing infringing peer-to-peer file sharing. 104 SABAM wanted
Scarlet Extended and other defendants to block peer-to-peer file
transfers in real time. 105 The defendants argued that such an order
would be a de facto general monitoring obligation in violation of ECD
Article 15, "inasmuch as any system for blocking or filtering
peer-to-peer traffic would necessarily require general surveillance of all
the communications passing through [their] network[s]."10 6 In other
99.
ECD, supra note 5, at 6 (recital 48).
100.
Id. at 6 (recital 47).
101.
See Content Registration, AUDIBLE MAGIC, https://www.audiblemagic.com/contentregistration [https://perma.cc/5RBV-MFZZ].
102.
Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon, Open Letter to the European Commission, MEDIUM
(Dec. 8, 2016), https://medium.com/eu-copyright-reform/open-letter-to-the-european-commission6560c7b5cacO [https://perma.cc/JU7Y-FRJK].
103.
Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SAv. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. 1-11959.
104.
Id. ¶¶ 53-54.
Id. ¶ 20.
105.
106.
Id. ¶ 25. Scarlet Extended also argued that the requirement would violate EU privacy
law, because it required identification of the internet protocol addresses of file sharers. See id. ¶ 26.
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words, in order to filter out any one type of data protocol from the
network's total traffic flow, the provider would have to screen all
data. 107
The CJEU agreed with Scarlet Extended, finding that
"[p]reventive

monitoring

of

this

kind

would ...

require

active

observation of all electronic communications . . and, consequently,
would encompass all information to be transmitted and all customers
using th[e] network."10 8 In addition, the court held, requiring an ISP to
continuously and indefinitely monitor all traffic for potential
infringements at its own expense would not strike a fair balance-as
required by Article 3(1) of the Enforcement Directive-between the
plaintiffs intellectual property rights and the defendant's right to
conduct business. 109
In SABAM v. Netlog, 110 the CJEU interpreted ECD Article 15 as
applied to a proposed filtering injunction against a social media
platform. As discussed above in Section III.A, Netlog was protected by
ECD Article 14's storage safe harbor. SABAM sought an injunction
requiring Netlog to implement and permanently operate a filtering
system "capable of identifying electronic files containing musical,
cinematographic or audio-visual work[s] ...

with a view to preventing

those works from being made available to the public."1 11 This is
precisely what the Commission proposed for providers covered by
Article 13, regardless of their eligibility for ECD Article 14's storage
safe harbor. 112 Citing Scarlet Extended, the CJEU in Netlog held that
such an injunction would violate ECD Article 15:
Preventive monitoring of this kind would thus require active observation of files
stored by users with the hosting service provider and would involve almost all of the
information thus stored and all of the service users of that provider .... It follows
that that injunction would require the hosting service provider to carry out general
monitoring, something which is prohibited by Article 15(1).113

In light of Scarlet Extended and Netlog, any insistence that
Article 13's measures requirement would not require general
monitoring rings hollow. Services like Content ID, which the music
industry demanded by name, work by monitoring all content from all
users all the time. The CJEU has stated clearly that such monitoring

107.
108.
109.

See id. ¶ 25.
Id. ¶ 39.
Id. ¶¶ 48-49.

110.
111.
112.
113.

Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV, 2012 E.C.R. 85,
Id. ¶ 26.
See DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 43, at 3.
Netlog NV, 2012 E.C.R. 85, ¶¶ 37-38.
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amounts to "general monitoring."1 1 4 As proposed, Article 13's preventive
measures requirement effectively repealed ECD Article 15 for ECD
Article 14 storage providers.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL

Criticism of proposed Article 13 focused on three main types of
harms: harms to individuals' expressive freedom, harms to online
businesses, and harms to innovation and competition at the internet's
application layer.1 15 For a proposal designed to address a quite specific
power imbalance in the music streaming market, Article 13 represented
a substantial disruption of longstanding copyright policy, creating
shockwaves for services beyond YouTube, content beyond music, and
fundamental human rights beyond the protection of intellectual
property.116

This Part surveys the primary objections to Article 13 from civil
society groups, human rights advocates, and online businesses. In doing
so, it exposes the risks of drafting generally applicable legislation to
serve narrow sectoral interests.
A. Harms to Individual Users
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(CFR) protects freedom of expression, including the freedom to receive
and impart information.1 17 It also protects the right to intellectual
property. 118 In cases where fundamental rights collide, policy makers

114.
Case C-70/10, Scarlet v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. 1-11959, ¶ 40.
115.
See, e.g., Danny O'Brien & Jeremy Malcolm, 70+ Internet Luminaries Ring
the Alarm on EU Copyright Filtering Proposal, EFF BLOG (June 12, 2018),
https://www. eff.org/deeplinks/20 18/06/internet-luminaries-ring-alarm-eu-copyright-filtering-proposal [https://perma.cc/YX7C-8X4P] (describing and linking to a letter opposing Article 13 signed
by Vint Cerf, Tim Berners-Lee, and other prominent technologists who built the early internet);
David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion
and expression), Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, OL OTH 41/2018 (June
13, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL-OTH-41-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CP9M-B5FP] (asserting Article 13's incompatibility with Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 15 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)).
116.
See Kaye, supra note 115.
117.
See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 326/02, art. 11, 2012 O.J.
(C 326) 391, 398 [hereinafter "CFR"].
118.
Id. at 399 (art. 17).
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and judges must attempt to balance them, aiming for proportionality
when fashioning remedies.11 9
The CJEU recognized in Scarlet Extended and Netlog that
content-filtering requirements implicate the expressive rights of
internet users because ACR systems are unable to distinguish between
lawful and unlawful content. 120 ACR systems are built on
content-matching algorithms, which means they can recognize content
in an upload that duplicates content in a reference file. 12 1 Not all
copying is legally actionable, however; there are limitations and
exceptions to copyright that permit unauthorized copying in certain
circumstances. 12 2 Because copyright is not an absolute right to exclude
all secondary uses, detecting a match between an upload and a
reference file is only the first step in determining if there has been
copyright infringement. Unfortunately, today's ACR systems can't go
beyond that first step to analyze whether an uploader's duplicated
content falls within an exception or limitation. 123 ACR systems are thus
prone to false positives and resultant expressive harms.
Despite Audible Magic's confident claims about the accuracy of
its system for detecting infringement, the shortcomings of ACR for
copyright enforcement are well-documented. For example, Ben
Depoorter and Robert Kirk Walker count enforcement automation
among several sources of false positives that bedevil the copyright
system and give creators of the past veto power over creators of the
present. 124 Toni Lester and Dissislava Pachamanova examine the
problem of algorithmic false positives in the specific context of hip-hop
music on YouTube, arguing that Content ID disproportionately
hampers creativity in hip-hop because artists in that genre rely heavily
on sampled loops and other de minimis borrowed elements. 125 From an
expressive rights standpoint, ACR would be a less problematic
enforcement tool if vendors could train algorithms to assess
119.
Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV, 2012 E.C.R. 85, ¶ 42.
120.
Id. ¶ 50; Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. 1-11959, ¶ 52,
https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/collages/26395 [https://perma.cc/4XTH-RTHW].
121.
Engstrom & Feamster, supra note 23, at 18.
122.
Exceptions and limitations are not harmonized at the EU level; rather, they are
permissive for member states. See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 6, at 16-17 (art. 5).
123.
See Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 290 (2019) (observing
that context-specific factors that should be accounted for in fair use determinations are not
considered in algorithmic policing systems).
124.
Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 319, 332-36 (2013).
125.
Toni Lester & Dessislava Pachamanova, The Dilemma of False Positives: Making
Content ID Algorithms More Conducive to Fostering Innovative Fair Use in Music Creation, 24
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 51, 53 (2017).
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context- dependent secondary uses of copyrighted material. 126 Although
machine-learning technology is advancing, it isn't there yet. 12 7
ACR systems are also unable to detect unwarranted claims on
public domain material that arise from mistaken or fraudulent
submission to vendors of reference files containing such material. When
it comes to a provider like Audible Magic that ingests hundreds of
thousands of new reference files every month, questions loom large
concerning proper verification of copyright ownership and safeguards
against overclaiming. Some notorious examples of public domain
material wrongly claimed by rights holders through YouTube's Content
ID system are white noise, 128 bird songs, 129 NASA mission footage, 130
and Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. 131
In assessing the draft DSM Directive's net impact on
fundamental rights guaranteed by the CFR, the Commission concluded
that the directive as a whole would "have a positive impact on copyright
as a property right" and only a "limited impact on the ... freedom of
expression and information . . . due to the mitigation measures put in

place and a balanced approach to the obligations set on the relevant
stakeholders." 1 32 The Commission's proposal did not, however, address
the known limitations of ACR technology or the impact of those
limitations on the expressive rights of users attempting to share
third-party content lawfully but without authorization.
B. Harms to Online Businesses
The CFR also recognizes the right to conduct a business as a
fundamental right. 133 To the extent that statutory licensing and
126.
See generally Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1094-99
(2017) (considering the challenges and potential of automating fair use analysis with machine
learning and artificial intelligence).
127.
See Burk, supra note 123.
128.
Chris Baraniuk, White Noise Video on YouTube Hit by Five Copyright Claims, BBC
(Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42580523 [https://perma.cc/5WRE-UZCR].
129.
Mike Masnick, Guy Gets Bogus YouTube Copyright Claim... On Birds Singing
in
the
Background,
TECHDIRT
(Feb.
27,
2012),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20 120227/001529 17884/guy-gets-bogus-youtube-copyright-claim-birds-singing-background.shtml [https://perma.cc/BJL6-7K36].
130.
Timothy B. Lee, How YouTube Lets Content Companies "Claim"NASA Mars Videos,
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 8, 2012), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/20 12/08/how-youtube-lets-content-companies-claim-nasa-mars-videos/ [https://perma.cc/39F2-6TDY].
131.
Ulrich Kaiser, Google: Sorry Professor, Old Beethoven Recordings on YouTube Are
Copyrighted, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 3, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/09/how-contentid-knocked-down-decades-old-recordings-of-beethoven/ [https://perma.cc/6VD4-KWUE].
132.
DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 43, at 9.
133.
CFR, supra note 117, at 399 (art. 16).
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filtering obligations impose costs and burdens on the businesses to
which they apply, Article 13 impacted the right to conduct a business.
The question is whether the Commission got the right balance between
the interests of rights holders and the interests of online businesses
subject to Article 13's proposed monitoring obligation.
A coalition of 240 EU-based online businesses thought the
Commission got it wrong. Their CEOs signed an open letter urging
members of European Parliament (MEPs) to reject Article 13 as
proposed. 134 The letter cited the financial and operational burdens of
implementing filtering systems, the inaccuracy of available technology,
and the lack of protection in Article 13 for small- and medium-sized
enterprises. 135 The draft DSM Directive, they wrote, "fail[s] to strike a
fair balance between creators and all other parts of society." 136
In Netlog, the CJEU considered harm to the defendant service
provider's business interests when it considered whether the challenged
filtering injunction reflected a fair balance between the parties'
competing rights. 137 The court held that a permanent, service-wide
filtering injunction was not justifiable. 138 To reach that conclusion, it
surveyed what the injunction required Netlog to do: install a filtering
system to monitor all or most of the content it hosted, monitor user
uploads without any time limitation, and monitor not only for existing
works but for works to be created in the future. 139 In its analysis, the
court cited both the CFR and the Enforcement Directive 140:
[S]uch an injunction would result in a serious infringement of the freedom of the
hosting service provider to conduct its business since it would require that hosting
service provider to install a complicated, costly, permanent computer system at its
own expense, which would also be contrary to the conditions laid down in Article 3(1)
of Directive 2004/48, which requires that measures to ensure the respect of
intellectual-property rights should not be unnecessarily complicated or costly. 141

"Complicated," "costly," and "permanent" is a trio of adjectives that also
applies to the technical measures the Commission mandated in its
Article 13 proposal.

134.

Jos Poortvliet, 240 EU Businesses Sign Open Letter Against Copyright Directive Art.

11 & 13, NEXTCLOUD (Mar. 19, 2019), https://nextcloud.com/blog/130-eu-businesses-sign-open-letter-against-copyright-directive-art- 11-13/ [https://perma.cc/P2MV-PXZ6] (reposting an open letter
from CEOs to members of the European Parliament).
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
137.
See Case C-360/10, SABAMv. Netlog NV, 2012 E.C.R. 85, ¶¶ 43-47 (holding that the
injunction did not strike a fair balance).
Id. ¶ 52.
138.
139.
Id. ¶ 45.
140.
141.

Directive 2004/48, 2004 O.J. (L 157/45) (EC).
Id. ¶ 46 (emphasis added).
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For whatever reason, the Commission appears to have ignored
Netlog and Scarlet Extended in its assessment of Article 13's impact on
the right of online service providers to conduct business. The
Commission believed that the filtering requirement was unproblematic
because "it only applie[d] to information society services storing and
giving access to large amounts of copyright-protected content uploaded
by their users." 142 Such services, presumably, could afford to pay the
freight. But what counts as "large amounts"? Every UGC service
operating at internet scale hosts what one might reasonably describe as
large amounts of copyright-protected content. For a policy intended to
target YouTube specifically, DSM Directive Article 13 caused
widespread alarm within the European Union's growing online
business sector.
C. Harms to Innovation and Competition
Among the concerns the EU internet businesses raised in their
open letter to MEPs was that Article 13 as proposed would harm
innovation and competition by imposing costs and burdens that small
enterprises are not in a position to bear. 143 By creating barriers to entry
for new services that might compete with-or even displace-today's
giants, cost-intensive regulations enacted to discipline those giants
could operate counterproductively to further entrench them. Lacking a
carve-out of any kind for small- and medium-sized businesses, Article
13 threatened to chill investment in new EU-based content-sharing
services and to raise operating costs for existing ones.
The expense of operating a filtering system involves both
technological and human resources. The necessary technological
resources are in the form of software and hardware. The necessary
human resources are in the form of ongoing customer support-for both
rights holders and users. Rights holders continuously submit new
reference files for inclusion in ACR databases. To prevent mistake and
fraud, each assertion of copyright ownership in a reference file must be
verified. Users, for their part, continuously appeal mistaken and
abusive automated claims. Those appeals must ultimately be decided
by humans, given the technological limits of ACR systems. Under
Article 13, all compliance costs were allocated to service providers.
The big players can afford the cost of mandatory technical
measures. YouTube long ago absorbed the cost of developing Content

142.
DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 43, at 9.
143.
See Poortvliet, supra note 134 ("European companies like ours will be hindered in their
ability to compete or will have to abandon certain markets completely.").
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ID, which it put at $60 million in 2014.144 Including ongoing operational
costs, YouTube has spent a total of $100 million on the system. 14 5 And,

as mentioned above in Section III.B, most of the internet's largest and
most popular content-sharing services already voluntarily license ACR
technology from Audible Magic. The cost of those licenses is
undisclosed, and it is unclear what additional human-resource costs
those services incur in connection with licensed services.
Startups and smaller providers, by contrast, have not already
built or licensed ACR systems. 1 4 6 They haven't already hired-and
likely couldn't pay-staff to manage the related customer-support
issues. Whatever costs of compliance are associated with the DSM
Directive will be new to them. To the extent that those costs prevent
small and new providers from operating profitably, those providers will
cease to exist, further concentrating power in the internet's giants.14 7
Another competition-related issue arising from Article 13 is the
lack of competition in the market for ACR technology that offers
permission-management for user-uploaded copyrighted content.14 8 As
stated above in Section III.B, Google does not license Content ID to
third parties, which makes Audible Magic the only obvious alternative.
New entrants to the ACR market could provide competition, but they
will need to steer clear of Audible Magic's portfolio of patents covering
ACR and fingerprinting technology. 149

144.
See Katherine Oyama,
Why the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Is
Working Just Fine...,DIGITAL Music NEWS (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2014/04/10/dmeaworkingjustfine/ [https://perma.cc/53UK-WEND] (stating the cost of
developing Content ID).
145.
Google, Inc., supra note 27, at 27.
146.
See Poortvliet, supra note 134 ("Most companies are neither equipped nor capable of
implementing the automatic content filtering mechanisms [Article 13] requires, which are
expensive and prone to error.").
147.
See id. ("Although the purpose of these regulations is to limit the powers of big US
Internet companies like Google or Facebook, the proposed legislation would end up having the
opposite effect. Article 13 requires filtering of massive amounts of data, requiring technology only
the Internet giants have the resources to build.").
148.
There are several other providers who offer ACR technology for related use
cases-some involving cross-device marketing and audience analytics, others geared to image
recognition. See Impact Assessment, supra note 87 ("The aim of the table is to give an indicative
and non-exhaustive list of available services covering different content and different features,
based on publicly available information. It is not to be read as a comparison of services and their
prices.").
149.
See
Patents,
AUDIBLE
MAGIC,
https://www.audiblemagic.com/patents/
[https://perma.cc/U43A-GV5J] (describing patents in the areas of "[d]igital fingerprint-based
media detection technology," "[i]dentification of content as it flows across networks," and
"[a]pproaches to caching and indexing a reference database to improve the performance of the
system").
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An additional hurdle for new entrants in the ACR market is
access to reference files. With its current store of over ten million
reference files, Audible Magic has already scaled and won the trust of
the world's largest corporate rights holders, giving it a considerable
first-mover advantage. In order to minimize legal exposure,
content-sharing services subject to a technical measures mandate will
logically choose an ACR vendor with an established reputation and a
vast database of reference files. Right now, Audible Magic is the market
leader, touting its Copyright Compliance Service as "the industry
standard," which "the biggest names in music ... most often
recommend." 15 0
V. ARTICLE 17: FROM DE JURE TO DE FACTO TECHNICAL MEASURES
As a result of intense public opposition, 15 1 the EU Parliament
made several changes to Article 13 before approving it as Article 17 of
the DSM Directive. This Part summarizes those changes and evaluates
how effectively they answer the criticisms discussed in Part IV.
A. A Narrower Range of Covered Providers
The adopted version of DSM Directive Article 17 ostensibly
targets a narrower range of providers than Article 13 did. It abandons
use of the term "information society service providers"-a holdover from
the ECD-in favor of a new term of art: "online content-sharing service
provider" (OCSSP). 1 52 Recital 62 of Article 17 goes to great lengths to
qualify the definition of OCSSP in a way that appears to zero in on
YouTube and its ad-supported, engagement-driven business model. 153

150.
Copyright Compliance Service, AUDIBLE MAGIC, https://www.audiblemagic.com/compliance-service/ [https://perma.cc/7ZWF-EC8B].
151.
See, e.g., Jason Tashea, Proposed EU Regulation to Modernize Copyright Laws
Generates Controversy, Heated Opposition, ABA J. (Mar. 18, 2019), http://www.abajournal.com/web/article/proposed-eu-regulation-to-modernize-copyright-laws-generates-controversyand-heated-opposition [https://perma.cc/G42V-YPA3] (reporting on significant public opposition to
Article 13).
152.
See DSM Directive, supra note 1, at 119 (art. 17) (governing "use of protected content
by online content-sharing service providers").
153.
See id. at 106 (recital 62) ("The definition ... should target only online services that
play an important role on the online content market by competing with other online content
services, such as online audio and video streaming services, for the same audiences. The services
covered by this Directive are services, the main or one of the main purposes of which is to store
and enable users to upload and share a large amount of copyright-protected content with the
purpose of obtaining profit therefrom, either directly or indirectly, by organising it and promoting
it in order to attract a larger audience, including by categorising it and using targeted promotion
within it.").
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Recital 62 further stipulates that a provider's status as an
OCSSP must be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
a combination of elements, including number of users and number of
files hosted.15 4 Requiring case-by-case adjudication is presumably a way
to avoid implicating noncommercial and less dominant providers. But
case-by-case adjudication comes at the cost of certainty for businesses
that cannot determine from the face of the DSM Directive whether it
applies to them.
Further narrowing the scope of Article 17's coverage, Recital 62
lists several specific types of providers that should not be deemed
OCSSPs, including business-to-business cloud service providers,
cyberlockers, open-source software repositories, not-for-profit scientific
or educational repositories, and not-for-profit online encyclopedias. 15 5
These explicit exclusions address the concern that draft Article 13's
very broad definition of covered services would have captured a wide
swath of providers historically protected by ECD Article 14 and remote
from the music industry's quarrel with YouTube.
The caveat with recitals, however, is that they may be used in
aid of interpretation but they are not operative law. Therefore, it will
ultimately be for the CJEU to decide in litigation which providers fall
under the definition of OCSSP. In the meantime, the scope of the
definition will remain indeterminate. Even providers that are expressly
excluded in Recital 62 will have to grapple with a degree of uncertainty.
B. The Licensing Requirement
The licensing requirement in the Commission's original proposal
applied only to providers ineligible for the ECD Article 14 safe
harbor-a determination requiring adjudication under existing CJEU
precedents, including Google France, L'Ordal, and Netlog. As adopted,
DSM Directive Article 17 obviates the need to adjudicate a provider's
safe harbor eligibility by stating flatly that OCSSPs cannot qualify for
safe harbor under ECD Article 14.156 Article 17 also states flatly that
OCSSPs engage in communication to the public under InfoSoc Directive
Article 3(1).157

154.
Id. at 106 (recital 63).
155.
Id. at 106 (recital 62).
156.
Id. at 119 (art. 17, ¶ 3) ("When an online content-sharing service provider performs an
act of communication to the public or an act of making available to the public under the conditions
laid down in this Directive, the limitation of liability established in Article 14(1) of Directive
2000/31/EC shall not apply to the situations covered by this Article.").
157.
Id. at 119 (art. 17, ¶ 1) ("Member States shall provide that an online content-sharing
service provider performs an act of communication to the public or an act of making available to
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DSM Directive Article 17 thus establishes beyond peradventure,
without any need for judicial analysis, that a provider operating as an
OCSSP must license all copyright-protected content appearing on its
service.1 58 If the provider fails to do so, it faces liability for direct
infringement. By laying to rest questions about proposed Article 13's
interaction with existing provisions of the ECD and the InfoSoc
Directive, Parliament handed the music industry the clear-cut licensing
mandate it wanted and thereby removed its business dealings with
YouTube from the shadow of the ECD's safe harbor.
C. The Best Efforts Requirement
With respect to an OCSSP's obligation to prevent the availability
of unlicensed content on its service, DSM Directive Article 17 and its
corresponding recitals omit Article 13's references to technical
measures. Instead, Article 17 requires "best efforts" by OCSSPs to
prevent the appearance of unauthorized copyrighted material in
UGC. 15 9 What Article 17 doesn't say, and what the DSM Directive's
recitals don't admit, is that the preventive measures demanded in the
adopted text cannot realistically be achieved at scale without an ACR
system like Content ID.
Whereas the proposal for Article 13 unabashedly embraced
upload filters, DSM Directive Article 17-revised in response to the
criticisms discussed above in Part IV-seems to have been drafted for
plausible deniability on the filtering question. Instead of "effective
content recognition technologies,"1 60 it refers coyly to "high industry
standards of professional diligence . . . to ensure the unavailability of
specific works for which the rightholders have provided the . . . relevant

and necessary information." 16 1 In place of "deployed technologies," 1 62 it
requires unspecified "suitable and effective means." 163
Through the best efforts requirement, Article 17 displaces
the ECD's reactive notice-and-takedown model in favor of a

the public for the purposes of this Directive when it gives the public access to copyright-protected
works or other protected subject matter uploaded by its users.").
158.
See id. at 120 (art. 17, ¶ 1) ("An online content-sharing service provider shall therefore
obtain an authorisation from the rightholders ... for instance by concluding a licensing
agreement, in order to communicate to the public or make available to the public works or other
subject matter.").
159.
Id. (art. 17, ¶ 4(a)).
160.
DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 43, at 29 (art. 13, ¶ 1).
161.
DSM Directive, supra note 1, at 120 (art. 17, ¶ 4(b)).
162.
DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 43, at 20 (recital 39).
163.
DSM Directive, supra note 1, at 120 (art. 17, ¶ 5(b)).
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notice-and-staydown

model for OCSSPs.

164

An OCSSP can

avoid

liability for hosting inadvertently unlicensed third-party content by
promptly removing the claimed content upon receipt of notice from the
aggrieved rights holder. 165 Once the OCSSP has received notice
concerning a particular piece of content, it must use "best efforts to
prevent further uploads of the notified works and other subject matter
for which the rights holders have provided relevant and necessary
information." 166 Translated into the language of ACR, which DSM
Directive Article 17 pointedly avoids, "relevant and necessary
information" means digital reference files. The OCSSP is tacitly
charged with obtaining or creating a reference file for any content that
is the subject of a notice, and then screening all subsequent uploads to
prevent that content from reappearing.167 The best efforts requirement
is inarguably a de facto technical measures requirement.
To determine whether a provider has satisfied the best efforts
requirement, Article 17 lists factors to be taken into account, including
the type, audience, and size of the service and the type of content the
service hosts. 168 Other relevant factors include "the availability of
suitable and effective means and their cost." 169 The inclusion of the last
two factors is responsive to concerns discussed above in Sections IV.B
and IV.C about compliance costs for providers and the highly
concentrated market for ACR technology. The array of different factors
to be considered when assessing the adequacy of a provider's best efforts
avoids the inflexibility of rigid mandates but, like the vague definition
of OCSSP, undermines regulatory certainty for businesses.
One aspect of DSM Directive Article 17 that will be difficult for
member states to square with the de facto technical measures
requirement is a late-added prohibition on a general monitoring
obligation-a prohibition reminiscent of ECD Article 15. The text of
DSM Directive Article 17 tries to finesse the monitoring question by
limiting the best efforts staydown obligation to "specific works" 170 that
rights holders identify. As the CJEU recognized in Netlog, however,
algorithmically blocking specific content inevitably requires monitoring

164.
choice).
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Cf. Husovec, supra note 18, at 61-64 (discussing notice-and-staydown as a policy
DSM Directive, supra note 1, at 120 (art. 17,
Id. (art. 17, ¶ 6).
Id. (art. 17, ¶ 4(c)).
Id. (art. 17, ¶ 5(a)).
Id. (art. 17, ¶ 5(b)).
Id. (art. 17, ¶ 4(b)).

¶

4(c)).
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all content, which looks like general monitoring under any natural
definition of "general." 171
To the extent that a staydown mandate requires ACR
technology, and ACR technology works by monitoring all user uploads,
there is no practical way to implement Article 17's staydown mandate
without also requiring general monitoring. In this sense, Article 17
contains conflicting requirements that will be difficult for member
states to implement coherently.172
D. Limited Relief for New Businesses
In response to concerns about the business and competitive
harms associated with Article 13's proposed requirements, DSM
Directive Article 17 contains a very narrow exception for new OCSSPs.
To qualify, a business must be less than three years old and have
annual turnover of less than (10 million. 173 Businesses that meet those
conditions must still make best efforts to obtain licenses, but they are
subject only to a notice-and-takedown (versus a notice-and-staydown)
mandate for preventing the appearance of unlicensed content.1 74 A
notice-and-staydown mandate kicks in immediately, however, if an
otherwise qualified service exceeds an average of five million unique
monthly users over the previous calendar year.17 5
A critical question is whether this exception is too narrow to be
meaningful. Is the apparently arbitrary allowance of three years of
limited liability and lighter obligations enough to allow a new OCSSP
to gain a foothold? Given how rapidly new services can scale, is five
million unique monthly users too low a threshold to trigger
171.
See Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV, 2012 E.C.R. 85, ¶¶ 37-38.
172.
An October 2019 ruling from the CJEU, Glawischnig-Piesczek u. Facebook Ireland,
offers a quite generous interpretation of the permissible scope of "specific" monitoring under ECD
Article 15. The plaintiff sued Facebook, seeking an injunction requiring Facebook to permanently
block all posts identical or equivalent to a specific post containing defamatory statements about
her. The Austrian national court referred the case to the CJEU to determine whether such an
injunction would run afoul of Article 15's prohibition on general monitoring obligations. The CJEU
held that a national court may issue an injunction requiring a storage service provider to remove
specific prohibited content and to prevent reuploads of the same or equivalent content. Such
'specific" monitoring, the court said, does not violate Article 15 as long as the court's order is
sufficiently specific as to the equivalent content to be removed and does not require the service
provider to "carry out an independent assessment" that could not be accomplished using
'automated search tools and technologies." See Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook
Ireland, 2019 E.C.R. 821, ¶¶ 34-45. This result seems impossible to reconcile with the CJEU's
earlier reasoning in Netlog and Scarlet Extended about what counts as general monitoring.
DSM Directive, supra note 1, at 120 (art. 17, ¶ 6).
173.
Id.
174.
175.
Id.
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disqualification for companies less than three years old? As a point of
reference, it took YouTube less than two years to exceed seventy million
unique monthly users.17 6 Only time will tell whether the very limited
new business exception that Article 17 provides can actually help EU
startups disrupt, compete with, or dislodge dominant players like
YouTube and Facebook.
E. Speech-Protective Provisions
As adopted, DSM Directive Article 17 contains provisions
intended to address the free speech challenges associated with
automated enforcement. It provides that preventive measures "shall
not result in the prevention of the availability of works or other subject
matter uploaded by users, which do not infringe copyright."17 7 For the
benefit of OCSSP users, member states are required to protect certain
secondary uses of copyrighted material: quotation, criticism, review,
caricature, parody, and pastiche.1 78
The problem with Article 17's speech-protective provisions is
that they will be quite difficult to implement in practice, given the
technical limitations of today's ACR systems. To address the fact that
such systems are incapable of identifying public domain content or
applying context-dependent limitations and exceptions, Article 17
requires that OCSSPs implement complaint and redress mechanisms
for users who believe their content has been wrongly blocked or
removed.179 YouTube's Content ID system does incorporate an appeal
process, but users have criticized it for, among other things, taking too
long.18 0 Audible Magic's service does not incorporate complaint and
redress mechanisms at all, which means that OCSSPs outsourcing
compliance to Audible Magic will be responsible for either designing
and implementing user protections in-house or outsourcing that
function to yet another provider for yet another fee. Either way, the cost

176.
See Google Buys YouTube for $1.65bn, BBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6034577.stm
[https://perma.cc/4CEB-5MJ6]
("YouTube,
launched in February 2005, has grown quickly into one of the most popular websites on the
internet. It has 100 million videos viewed every day and an estimated 72 million individual visitors
each month.").
DSM Directive, supra note 1, at 120 (art. 17, ¶ 7).
177.
Id.
178.
179.
Id. (art. 17, ¶ 9).
180.
See, e.g., Shoshana Wodinsky, YouTube's Copyright Strikes Have Become a Tool for
Extortion, VERGE (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/11/18220032/youtubecopystrike-blackmail-three-strikes-copyright-violation [https://perma.cc/B84E-73MN] (reporting
that the appeal process can take at least a month, during which time the complainant is barred
from uploading any new content).

2020]

HOWMUSIC HACKED EU COPYRIGHTREFORM

357

of that function is likely to be significant, because appeals under Article
17 require human review. 181
VI. CONCLUSION

With the adoption of Article 17 of the DSM Directive, the CJEU's
eventual decisions in LF and Puls 4 TV no longer matter. By the time
the cases are decided, the court's analysis of ECD Article 14 and InfoSoc
Directive Article 3(1) as applied to YouTube will be moot. In the interest
of closing the "value gap," policy makers in Brussels assigned
themselves the task of "clarifying" how existing EU law should apply to
YouTube's business model. They did so by defining a new type of online
intermediary subject to new-and unforgiving-liability rules.
Under Article 17, an OCSSP is by definition liable to rights
holders under InfoSoc Directive Article 3(1) for any infringing UGC it
hosts and ineligible for safe harbor under ECD Article 14. As a result,
OCSSPs must take prescribed steps to avoid the liability their business
model entails. First, they must attempt to conclude licensing
agreements with all interested rights holders, so that all content
uploaded by users is preauthorized. Then, they must use best efforts to
ensure that no unlicensed copyrighted content is available to users.
Once notified of such content, they have an ongoing obligation to
prevent future uploads.
Granting the music industry's wish for narrowed safe harbors
that exclude YouTube, Article 17 converts the ECD's longstanding
notice-and-takedown regime into a notice-and-staydown regime. Article
17 avoids mentioning upload filters or technical measures, but the best
efforts provision constructively requires OCSSPs to implement ACR
systems capable of blocking any claimed content a rights holder declines
to license. Modifying the Commission's original proposal, which
contained no speech-protective provisions, Article 17 requires OCSSPs
to honor copyright exceptions and limitations when exercising best
efforts-a very tall order given the known limitations of existing ACR
technology.
In Content ID, YouTube has a prebuilt compliance
infrastructure for Article 17. That's because Article 17 was designed for
Content ID and not vice versa. From the drawing board, the
Commission's admitted policy goal was to adjust copyright liability
rules to redistribute wealth from YouTube to music industry
stakeholders. Whether Article 17 will actually accomplish that goal is

DSM Directive, supra note 1, at 109 (recital 70) ("Any complaint filed ...
181.
processed without undue delay and be subject to human review.").
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an open question. Against the music industry's potential benefits, we
must weigh potential losses to other stakeholders in the digital
economy. For new content-sharing services hoping to coexist and
compete with rich incumbents like YouTube, Article 17 changes the
rules of the game by increasing liability and raising operating costs. For
internet users and independent creators, it changes the rules of the
game by subjecting creative production to brittle and pervasive
algorithmic enforcement. The only stakeholders that look like sure
winners in the Article 17 sweepstakes are ACR providers like Audible
Magic, for whom the EU Parliament just did a monumental favor.

